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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MARINDA DAY,

Plaintif!-Appellant
vs.

LORENZO SMITH & SON, INC., a
Utah Corporation,
Defendant-Respondent

Case No.
10256

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Lorenzo Smith & Son, hereinafter referred to as "defendant" does not adopt the Statement of Facts set forth
in the brief of Marinda Day, hereinafter referred to as the
"plaintiff". The Jury answered five questions in a special
verdict resulting in a judgment in favor of the defendant,
no cause of action.
In view of the jury verdict and judgment, wherever
the evidence is in conflict, it must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the defendant. Rivas v. Pacific Finance
Co.,_ Utah 2d _, 397 P. 2d 990 (1964), Hales v. Peterson,
11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822 (1961).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of September 11, 1961, plaintiff was
riding as a passenger in a 1949 Chevrolet Sedan modified
into a pickup truck enroute from Fillmore to Provo, Utah,
on U.S. Highway 91. (R 215) The truck was driven by
plaintiff's friend, Larry Roberts, who was 16 years of age.
(R 214) It was a clear fall morning and the roads were dry.
(R 138) Roberts was driving at approximately 50 to 60 miles
per hour. (R 216, 382) Juab County Sheriff Ray Jackson
was also proceeding North on U.S. Highway 91 in a patrol
car about one half mile in back of the Roberts truck. (R 139)
At approximately 10 :30 A.M. Roberts approached an area
where other vehicles were parked along the highway about
4.3 miles north of Nephi, Utah. There was a Ford station
wagon parked on the East shoulder of the highway facing
North. (Exh P-1) A Utah highway patrol car was parked
off the highway on the east side facing north. (R 140)
The two rear stop lights on the patrol car were flashing
on and off. (R 180) A foreign car was parked on the west
shoulder of the highway facing north. (Exh D-4) There
were other vehicles on the West side of the highway facing
South. (R 175, Exh P-1 and P-3) Utah Highway patrolman
Eldon Sherwood was on the West shoulder of the highway.
(R 177) Sherwood was standing at the rear of the foreign
car talking to a Mrs. Naismith. (R 176, 211) He was com·
pleting an investigation of a one car accident involving a
roll over of the foreign car. (R 174) Mr. Henry Kelly, his
son Robert, the occupants of the Ford Station wagon; Mr.
Desmond Naismith, Helen Naismith, the occupants of the
foreign car, and others were at the scene of the roll over
of the foreign car. (R 176) When Roberts approached the
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scene of the accident involving the foreign car, his speed
was not noticably diminished. (R 338) Roberts speed was
estimated at 45 to 60 miles per hour as he drove into the
area where the other cars were stopped. (R 339, 382) As
they cazne into the area, Roberts made a "slight turn" to
the left to go out around the patrolman's car. (R 256)
While Roberts was approaching the accident scene,
Joseph Ivy Mitchell, an employee of the defendant, was
driving defendant's 1961 Corvair box truck (Greenbriar)
South on U.S. Highway 91. (R 143) Mitchell drove through
the accident area "very slowly". (R 213) Helen Naismith
estimated his speed at 5 miles per hour. (R 213) As Mitchell proceeded South and Roberts proceeded North through
the scene of the first accident, the vehicles sideswiped each
other. (R 338) The impact between the two vehicles occurred South of the foreign (Naismith) car. (R 204, 346)
The noise of the impact was to the right rear of Sherwood
who turned immediately and saw the Roberts truck "take
off" obliquely down the east side of the highway, travel
some distance, turn sideways, skid and roll over one complete turn. (R 177, 178) The Roberts vehicle came to rest
310 feet down the highway from the point where the two
vehicles came together. (R 178) Mitchell drove defendant's
vehicle off on the west side of the highway about 150 feet
from the point of impact. (R 178) Sherwood got in his
patrol car and drove down the highway to the Roberts
truck. (R 184) Plaintiff had been thrown out of the truck
at the time it had rolled over. (R 327) Sherwood investigated the accident between the Roberts truck and defendant's Corvair Greenbriar. (R 174) In his investigation
Sherwood examined the debris on the highway, (R 182)
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the skid marks left by the Roberts truck, (R 179) the
damage to the two vehicles (R 184, 185) and he talked to
the drivers of the two vehicles. (R 181, 188) Sherwood
determined from his investigation that the impact between
the two vehicles occurred on the West (defendant's) side
of the highway. (R 184) Sherwood's examination of the
Roberts truck disclosed the brake pedal could be pushed
to the floor without any brake action. (R 184)
There was a conflict in the testimony as to whether the
point of impact was on the west or east side of the highway. The plaintiff and her driver, Larry Roberts, testified
the impact was on the east (plaintiff's) side. (R 233, 218)
Henry Kelly and his son Robert Kelly testified the impact
occurred on the west (defendant's) side. (R 339, 384) Desmond Naismith and Marion Brown testified the impact occurred on the east (plaintiff's) side. (R 194, 322) Sherwood,
the investigating officer, determined the impact was on the
west (defendant's) side of the highway. (R 184) Sheriff
Jackson, who came on the scene of the accident shortly
after it occurred, testified he couldn't tell where the point
of impact was. (R 145)
The case was submitted to the jury in a special verdict.
On the basis of the answers given by the jury, the court
entered a judgment of no cause of action. (R 420)
The only point raised on appeal is that the trial court
erred in permitting the highway patrolman to give his
opinion as to the point of impact.

;
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED
THE HIGHWAY PATROLMAN TO TESTIFY
AS TO THE POINT OF IMPACT.
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED THE PATROLMAN TO BE CROSS
EXAMINED ON THE POINT OF IMP ACT
AFTER PLAINTIFF OPENED THE INQUIRY
ON DIRECT EXAMINATION.
Plaintiff called highway patrolman Eldon C. Sherwood
as her own witness. (R 174) Sherwood testified he had 24
years experience in investigating accidents. (R 174) D~
fendant stipulated that patrolman Sherwood was an expert
in the matter of accident investigation. (R 174) Plaintiff's
attorney opened the subject of point of collision in his direct
examination of officer Sherwood.
Q. (Mr. Beesley) I see. Now, were there any

objective signs whatsoe1,er to determine the point
of collision? (Italics ours)
A.

No.

MR. NEBEKER: I will object to that, Your
Honor. I think he can state what he saw and let
the jury decide.
THE COURT: Well, since he says no, I guess
we don't have to pursue it further.
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Mr. Beesley: I don't intend to, Your Honor.

(R 181)

The inference raised by this question and answer was that
the patrolman could not determine the point of impact. On
Cross examination defendant's counsel asked Sherwood if
he had examined the road where the two vehicles collided,
if he found debris on the road and if he determined the
point of impact to which he answered "yes". Plaintiff's
counsel objected to any "opinion" from the patrolman.
Q. (Mr. Nebeker) I see. Now, you did examine
the roadway where these two vehicles had collided,
did you not?

A.

Yes.

Q. And you found that there was considerable
debris on the road there, did you not?

A. Well, I wouldn't know about the considerable amount, but there was debris.
Q. From your examination of the road, you
made a determination as to the approximate point of
impact, did you not?

A.

Yes.

Was that point of impact on the east or the
west side of the road?
Q.

A. It was near the center line, and my best
opinion, it may have beenMR. BEESLEY: I will object to any opinion,
Your Honor.
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THE COURT. Well, you may give your judgment. If you are giving us an opinion, he would be
right. If you mean by your opinion your best judgment as to what you judge it would be, I think you
might proceed, Sergeant, and I don't quite knowQ.

Give us your judgment.

MR. BEESLEY: Make the same objection,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let's find out if he has a judgment or giving an opinion. If he is giving an opinion,
he can't.
Do you have a judgment as to where the
point of impact occurred?
Q.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Will you tell us what that judgment is?

MR. BEESLEY: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It's overruled. He may give his
judgment.
A. As near the center line and probably a
little bit west.
MR. BEESLEY: I object to any probability,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: If you are confining it to your
judgmentQ.

Just give us your best judgment.

THE COURT: You can tell us your judgment.
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line.

MR. BEESLEY: I believe he said the center
A.

Near the center line.

Q.

Was it on the west or the east of the center

A.

Do I have to answer that "Yes" or "No"?

Q.

Yes.

A.

My opinion is no good?

Q.

Just give us your judgment.

line?

THE COURT: You can give your judgment,
Sergeant.
A. My judgment, slightly to the west of the
center line.
Q. Would you say it was about a foot to the
west of the center line?

A.

I think that would be a fair figure.

Q.

It could have been a little further west?

It could have been a little further east?

A.

Yes. (R 182, 183, 184)

The trial court, in directing defendant's counsel to find out
if the patrolman had a "judgment" as to the point of impact rather than an "opinion", was apparently attempting
to determine if the patrolman's testimony was based on his
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personal observation and investigation of the accident scene
or whether his testimony arose from a belief or impression
obtained from some other source.
The plaintiff's attorney did not object to the patrolman's opinion on the ground it was not proper cross examination. He obviously could not object on that ground because he had opened the inquiry in his direct examination
by asking the patrolman if there were any "objective signs"
whatsoever to determine the point of impact which was
answered "no".
Q. I see. Now, were there any objective signs
whatsoever to determine the point of collision?

A.

No. (R 181)

In view of the negative inference created by the attorney
for the plaintiff on direct examination, defendant's attorney was entitled to cross examine the patrolman as to
whether or not there were "objective signs" on the highway to determine the point of collision, and if so, where it
was. Plaintiff should not be permitted to raise a negative
inference on direct examination and then object to cross
examination on the same subject.
It is axiomatic that a witness may be cross examined

as to his direct testimony and as to whatever goes to explain, modify or discredit what he has stated on direct
examination. 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses Sec. 610
"Character and Purpose. The cross-examination of witnesses is one of the safeguards to accuracy
and truthfulness. The test of cross-examination is
the highest and the most indispensable known to the
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law for the discovery of truth. When a witness has
been examined in chief, the other party has the right
to cross-examine for the purpose of ascertaining and
exhibiting the situation of the witness with respect
to the parties and to the subject of the litigation, his
interest, his motive, his inclinations, his prejudices,
his means of obtaining a correct and certain know].
edge of the facts to which he has borne testimony,
the manner in which he has used those means, and
his powers of discernment, memory and description.
The purpose of the cross-examination is to test the
truthfulness of the witness, to sift, modify, or
explain what has been said, to develop new or old
facts in a view favorable to the cross-examiner, or
to discredit the witness, and, if he is the plaintiff, to
test his good faith-the righteousness of his case."
(Italics ours)
The adversary system of justice is predicated on the
fundamental right of cross examination. In State v. ZolanTakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044 (1927) this Court stated
that in a judicial investigation the right of cross examination is an absolute right and not a mere privilege of the
party against whom the witness is called. It is only after
such right has been substantiated and fairly exercised that
the allowance of further cross examination will be discretionary. This Court has previously held that cross examination should never be curtailed or limited so long as it tends
to disclose the truth. State v. Peck, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P.
2d 630 (1953).
If there ever was any valid objection to Sherwood's
testimony regarding point of impact, plaintiff's attorney
waived his objection by opening the matter on direct ex-

amination.
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In Wollan v. Billett, 375 P. 2d 146 (Wash. 1962) the
Supreme Court of Washington held that defendant's attorney had waived his objection to an opinion given by a
witness as to point of impact, when he had opened the inquiry as to the point of impact on cross examination. The
Court stated :
"A member of the traffic division of the Tacoma
police department was called as a witness for the
respondents. On cross examination, appellant's
counsel inquired if the witness could fix the point of
impact, to which he replied "Not exactly, no, sir."
Thereafter, on redirect examination, he did express
his opinion on the point in question, to which the
appellant's counsel objected on the ground that the
witness was not qualified as an expert. Assuming
the objection valid, it was waived by the appellant
in opening the inquiry." (Italics ours)
In Hooper v. Bronson, 266 P. 2d 590 (Cal 1954) the r
trial court permitted a police officer to express his opinion
as to the point of impact between a truck and sedan. The
opinion was elicited on cross examination over the objection
of plaintiff's counsel. The Appellate Court held that the
trial court did not commit prejudicial error in allowing the
police officer to express his opinion as to the point of impact. The court said that when the exact point of impact
is in dispute, a police officer experienced in investigating
accidents might express his opinion thereon, basing such
opinion on the physical facts, such as location of skid marks,
broken glass and other debris. The court called attention
to the fact that the officer had previously testified, in effect, as to the point of impact.

12
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff should not
be permitted to complain of testimony elicited on cross
examination when she opened the subject matter on direct.
To prohibit cross examination on a subject opened on direct
is to nullify defendant's right to a fair trial.
B. POINT OF IMP ACT IS A PROPER SUBJECT FOR EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY

In considering the admissibility of expert opinion testimony, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Webb v. Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.
2d 1094 (1959):
"Inherent in the position of the trial judge in
the immediate control of the trial is the responsibility of passing upon whether the subject justifies
expert testimony and the qualifications of the witness as to whether he can give sound and reliable
help to the jury on it."
The general rule with regard to the admissibility of
opinion testimony on point of impact is succinctly stated
in 20 Am. Jur. Evidence Section 806:

"* * * Opinions are admissible also as to
the location of a point where a specific occurrence
took place * * *" (citing in Supplement Annotation
at 66 ALR 2d 1048)
The question of admissibility of opm10n evidence on
point of impact has been considered by a number of courts
in recent years. An annotation in 66 ALR 2d 1048 entitled
"Admissibility of opinion evidence as to point of impact or
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coll-ision in motor vehicle accident case" presents an exhaustive review of the cases dealing with the problem.
The annotator in his summary concludes that while
some cases hold that expert evidence as to point of impact
is not admissible, there is a strong and apparently growing
authority holding or recognizing that skilled or expert
opinion evidence is admissible on the point of collision.
"These courts (holding that expert opinion evidence is admissible on point of import) recognize
that opinions given by skilled or expert witnesses
aid the jury, or the court sitting in lieu thereof, in
drawing correct inferences from the raw and unsorted facts, and that such evidence does not usurp
the province of the jury, since the jury does not
have to accept the witness' opinions. In addition,
it may be noted that the cases holding or recognizing
the admissibility of skilled or expert opinion evidence show that the witness giving the testimony
had an opportunity to investigate the scene reasonably soon after the accident a.nd had sufficient experience to form a reasonable opinion based upon
his observations. (Italics ours)
With regard to the question of admissibility of expert
opinion testimony on the subject of point of impact it may
be noted generally that a number of later decisions man.ifest
a more favorable attitude toward the admission of expert
testimony upon this question. See 66 ALR 2d 1054. The
Courts reach this conclusion upon the ground that a skilled
or expert witness can aid the Jury in drawing correct inferences from raw and unsorted facts.
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In the following cases the Courts held that point of
impact was a proper subject for expert opinion testimony.

UTAH
The annotation in 66 ALR 2d 1048, 1067 lists Utah
among the States admitting opinion evidence on point of
impact citing State v. Bleazard, 103 Utah 113, 133 P. 2d
1000 (1943). Defendant Bleazard was convicted of the
crime of involuntary manslaughter as the result of an automobile collision. A highway patrolman who reached the
scene shortly after the accident, was permitted to identify
a map prepared by him which gave certain measurements
and attempted to locate the point of impact.
On cross examination the patrolman was asked the
following question by counsel for defendant:
"In your opinion, is it not possible and probable
that it was the crash of the Boyington car that
caused the death of Mrs. Gardiner and not the impact with the Bleazard car?"
Counsel for the State objected that the question was not the
subject of opinion evidence. The court sustained the objection and the defendant assigned it as error.
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial
court stating:
"It is not the province of a witness to act as
judge or jury and questions calling for his opinion
should be so framed as to not call upon him to determine controverted questions of fact or to pass
upon the preponderance of testimony."
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The objection was sustained on the ground that the question was on causation and invaded the province of the jury.
There was no contention made that point of impact was
not a proper subject for expert opinion testimony or that
it invaded the province of the jury.
The question of causation, i.e. "what caused the death
of Mrs. Gardiner", is an entirely different matter from that
of point of impact i.e. "where was the place on the highway
where the collision occurred?"

The opinion clearly states that the highway patrolman
was permitted to identify a map which attempted to locate
the point of impact.
1.
With regard to the question of causation, the courts
attention is directed to Hooper v. General Motors, 123 Utah
515, 260 P. 2d 549 (1953) where this court held an expert
may give an opinion as to the cause of a particular occurrence or condition. This Court stated:
"The modern tendency and the rule of this
court is that an expert may give an opinion as to
the cause of a particular occurrence or condition regardless of whether the cause of such occurrence
or condition is in dispute and regardless of whether
the jury must determine which of the causes urged
by the respective parties is the correct one."

CALIFORNIA
In People v. Haeussler, 260 P. 2d 8 (Cal. 1953) the
Supreme Court of California held that a highway patrolman with many y~11s experience in investigating accidents
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and who was upon the scene a few minutes after the accident could give his opinion as to the point of impact. His
opinion was based upon an inspection of skid and gouge
marks on the pavement and the location of oil, broken glass,
parts of the vehicles and other debris.
See also Hooper v. Bronson Supr-a (Holding expert
opinion is admissible as to point of impact)

IDAHO

In Grant v. Clark, 305 P. 2d 752 (Idaho 1956) The
Supreme Court held the trial court properly admitted the
testimony of a Sheriff wherein he gave his opinion as to
the probable point of impact. The Court stated :
"The appellant contends that it was inadmissible as the sheriff was not qualified as an expert.
The sheriff testified that he had examined a great
many accidents during his work, which extended
over two terms, or four years, as sheriff; that in
his investigations he had tried to determine what had
happened at the accidents, and particularly to locate
the points of impact of the automobiles in the various accidents. The record discloses that this witness
arrived shortly after the collision. He testified to
the location of the two automobiles when he arrived,
and said that he observed the debris on the righthand side of the road, on the south edge of the oil,
when going toward Hammett. He testified that from
his investigation that in his opinion the point of
impact was on the south side of the road (Clarke's
side) near the edge of the oil."
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's ruling admitting the testimony of the Sheriff.
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ARIZONA

In Gray v. Woods, 324 P. 2d 220 (Arizona 1958) The
Supreme Court held that a highway patrolman was properly allowed to give his opinion on the point of impact. The
patrolman testified that as a result of his investigation he
found dirt and debris on the highway and gouge marks in
the pavement left by one of the wheels of the Studebaker.
Based upon his previous experience and training and the
evidence at the scene of the collision, he was permitted to
give his opinion as to the point of impact.
The Court stated:
"It is now generally recognized that a highway patrolman or other officer, when shown to have
proper training and experience in the investigation
of traffic accidents, testifying as an expert witness,
may properly give an opinion as to the point of. im.
pact in a traffic accident where his opinion is based
on marks on the highway, damage to the vehicles
involved and the location of debris on the highway
or other indicia at the scene, but not when such
opinion is founded on statements made to him by
other persons. Grant v. Clarke, 78 Idaho 412, 305 P.
2d 752; Wells Truckways, Ltd. v. Cebrian, 122 Cal.
App. 2d 666, 265 P. 2d 557; Kalfus v. Fraze, 136
Cal. App. 2d 415, 288 P. 2d 967; People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P. 2d 8; Nielsen v. Wessels,
247 Iowa 213, 73 N.W. 2d 83; Tuck v. Buller, Okl.,
311 P. 2d 212."
COLORADO

In McNelley v. Smith, 368 P. 2d 555 (Colo. 1962) the
Supreme Court held that it was competent for a police of-
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ficer to testify as to the point of impact and the angle of
a collision. These were matters which he determined solely
from the physical facts existing at the scene of the accident.

C. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINION
ON POINT OF IMP ACT RESTS WITHIN DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT AND ITS RULING WILL NOT BE REVERSED UNLESS
DISCRETION HAS BEEN ABUSED
A number of courts have held that the question of admissibility of expert opinion as to the point of impact in

a motor vehicle accident case must be left to the common
sense and discretion of the trial court.
In the following cases the appellate court held the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert opinion
testimony.
UTAH

The Utah Supreme Court in Webb v. Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corporation Supra, confronted with the question
of admissibility of expert opinion testimony, stated that
the trial court must be allowed a considerable latitude of
discretion in making such determination.
"The practical exigencies of the situation make
it necessary that the trial court be allowed considerable latitude of discretion in making such deter·
mination. His rulings in that regard should not be
disturbed lightly, nor at all unless it clearly appears
that he was in error in his judgment on the matter."
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Also in Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter Day Saints
Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330 (1957) this court in
discussing the admissibility of expert opinion testimony
where the objection was that it went to the "very issue
before the jury", held the testimony admissible saying:
"If the opinion evidence is such that it will aid
the jury in understanding their problems and lead
them to the truth as to disputed issues of fact, it is
competent and admissible, irrespective of whether
it bears directly upon the ultimate fact the jury is
to determine. And the trial judge is allowed a wide
discretion in regard to the allowance of such testimony. (Italics ours)

CALIFORNIA
In Zelayeta v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 232 P. 2d 572
(Cal. 1951) the appellate court held the trial court did not
err in permitting a traffic officer to give his opinion as
to the point of impact in a collision between a bus and an
automobile. The court stated it was within the discretion
of the trial court to admit this opinion evidence.

WASHINGTON

In Gerberg v. Crosby 329 P. 2d 184 (Wash. 1958) the
Supreme Court of Washington, in a well reasoned opinion,
held that there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion
in admitting a police officer's opinion as to point of impact based on the physical facts observed after the accident.
The officer was qualified as an expert in accident investigation. The Court relates the sequence of his testimony as follows :
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"When asked whether he had located the Point
of impact in the acCident between the Crosby car
and the Gerberg motorcycle, he replied that he had.
Appellants objected to Hendren's testimony as to
the location of the point of impact on the ground
that this was not a proper subject of expert testimony. No objection was made to the qualifications
of Hendren as an expert. The trial court overruled
the objection and admitted the evidence. Hendren
made it clear that he based his opinion solely on
skid marks made by the motorcycle after the collision."
The court then discussed the reasons why op1mon testimony should be admitted quoting from Professor Edmund
M. Morgan in his foreword to the Model Code of Evidence:

"Judges and lawyers agree with commentators
that the entire body of law dealing with opinion
evidence needs radical revision. Mr. Wigmore says
that the opinion rule 'has done more than any one
rule of procedure to reduce our litigation towards
a state of legalized gambling.' The rules evolved in
this country which prevent a witness from relating
his relevant experiences in language naturally and
ordinarily used by laymen, because phrased in terms
of inferences or conclusions, have invited numberless
t~ivial appeals and have caused many indefensible
reversals. They are vague in phrasing and capable
of capricious application. There is an encouraging
tendency in some modern trial courts to disregard
them and in the more progressive appellate courts
to refuse to interfere with the trial judge's applies·
tion of them.''
The Court quoted from Grismore v. Consolidated
Products Co., 5 N.W. 2d 646, 655 (Iowa 1942) where the
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court discussed the place of expert testimony in modern
trials, saying :

" * * * It would be difficult to find a subject
in law in which there has been more judicial confusion and quibbling, both in our own court and in
those of other jurisdictions. It would also be difficult
to find a single subject that has been provocative of
more useless appeals than the matter of expert opinion testimony. In the early days of court procedure
there was less need of expert opinion testimony. But
with the complexity of modern life and with the
amazing growth and advancement of a myriad of
matters of science, art, mechanics, discovery, invention and industry, which touch our daily life
constantly on every side, a failure to make the fullest
use of expert opinions in court procedure means, in
a great many cases a denial of proof and necessarily
a denial of justice. For too many years too many
courts have so frowned upon expert opinion testimony and have so restricted its admission and
consideration that the triers of facts have been denied aid that was essential to a proper determination of litigated causes."
The court concluded by stating that in the field of
expert testimony much must be left to the common sense
and discretion of the trial court. The court found no
abuse of discretion in the admission of the officer's testimony.
OKLAHOMA

In Tuck v. Buller, 311 P. 2d 212, 66 ALR 2d 1043
(Okla. 1957) the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting a highway
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patrolman to state his opinion as to the point of impact.
The court stated that a wide latitude of discretion is given
the trial court in the determination of the admission of expert testimony. The court relied upon the California case
of Kalfus v. Fraze, 288 P. 2d 967 (Cal. 1955) wherein it
was held that a police officer with proper training and
experience in investigation of traffic accidents could give
expert testimony as to the point of impact when his opinion
derived from examination of physical evidence or indicia
at the scene.
The court held:
"The contention of defendant relative to the
alleged error in admitting expert testimony as to
point of impact being substantially the same as in
the Kalfus case, supra, and being without controlling precedent in our own state, we adhere to the
rule and reasoning enunciated therein, and apply
the same to this case, and hold that the highway
patrolman, who was qualified by training and experience in the investigation of traffic accidents
and submission of reports on facts and causes of
such accidents, may give expert testimony as to the
point of impact when, as in this case, his opinion
derives from examination of physical evidence or
indicia at the scene of the accident."
The trial judge must consider all the circumstances
under which the expert opinion is offered, including the
qualifications of the expert, the subject of his opinion, the
foundation for his opinion and whether or not it invades
the province of the jury. When the trial judge has admitted such testimony, his decision should not be over-
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turned unless there is a clear showing that he has abused
his discretion.
It is earnestly submitted that the trial judge in this

case did not abuse his discretion but properly permitted
the highway patrolman to testify on the point of impact.

D. THE OPINION OF PATROLMAN SHERWOOD WAS BASED UPON AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT SCENE.
Plaintiff contends in her brief (page 23) that the
opinion of Patrolman Sherwood was based upon some
source other than the competent facts. Plaintiff called
Sherwood as her own witness. (R. 174) Plaintiff admits
in her brief that she vouched for the patrolman's credibility when she put him on the witness stand. (Plaintiff's
brief page 9) . Plaintiff admitted the patrolman was
qualified to testify as to the point of impact by asking him
on direct examination if there were "objective signs'' to
determine the point of collision. (R 181) There were no
questions about the patrolman's qualifications as an expert. He had been investigating accidents for 24 years.
(R 174) The record unequivocally shows that the patrolman's testimony on the point of impact was based on his
personal observations at the accident scene.

He was on the highway investigating a prior accident
when the impact between the Robert's truck and defendant's vehicle occurred. (R 174) The noise of the impact
caused Sherwood to turn around in less than a second. (R
180)
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Q. (Mr. Beesley) What was the first thing
that occurred that drew your attention that an ac.
cident had happened?

me.

A.

The noise of the impact being so close to

Q. All right. Would you describe the sequence
of events after you heard the noise?

A. The noise was more to my rear and to my
right, so I just turned to the right and saw this
Davies vehicle taking off down the pavement on
the right or east side of the highway and it travelled
some distance, and then it turned sideways and
skidded and then rolled one complete turn. (R 177,
178)

The patrolman was an eye witness to the course travelled by the Roberts truck immediately after impact and its
roll over 310 feet down the highway. (R 177) Sherwood
testified to the skid marks laid down by the Robert's truck
after the impact and drew them on the blackboard. (R 179)
He measured the distance from the point where the two
vehicles came together to where they finally came to rest,
the Roberts truck going on north 310 feet and the defendant's vehicle going south 150 feet. (R 178)
Sherwood testified that he examined both the Robert's
truck and the defendant's vehicle and he described the
damage to both vehicles. (R 185) He further testified
that he examined the highway where the two vehicles
collided, that there was debris on the highway and that
he made a determination as to the approximate point of
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impact. (R 182) Sherwood testified to these facts from his
own personal observations.
There is not one scintilla of evidence in this case to
support plaintiff's contention that patrolman Sherwood
based his opinion on statements made by others.
The Court and the jury were made aware of the facts
upon which Sherwood based his opinion. The question of
the weight to be given his opinion was clearly a matter for
the jury. 20 Am. Jur. 671, Evidence, Section 798:
"The admissibility of expert testimony is a
question for the court, while its weight is a matter
properly evaluated by the jury."
E. ALLOWING THE PATROLMAN TO TESTIFY ON THE POINT OF IMP ACT DID NOT
CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Plaintiff claims in her brief (page 30) that the court
refused to permit Sheriff Jackson to give his "opinion"
(R 156) but permitted patrolman Sherwood to give his
"judgment" (R 184) as to the point of impact.

The record conclusively shows that plaintiff Jackson
could not determine the point of collision between the
Roberts truck and defendant's vehicle.
Q. (Mr. Beesley) Were you able to determine
the point of collision that these cars had?

A.

No.

Q.

Why not?
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A. There was no marks on the highway other
than the debris which covered a large area. Now,
this debris was glass and dirt, and there was no
point that I-we could determine or I could deter.
mine where the point of impact were and where
one car was in relationship to the other car. The
first marks laid down by any vehicle was the Roberts car after it left the scene, and if you don't
mind, I will show you where they started. (R 145)
On redirect examination plaintiff's attorney was asking Sheriff Jackson about the "marks" on the highway
running from the Roberts vehicle when the Sheriff volunteered his "opinion." He obviously was not going to
volunteer an opinion on the point of impact when he had
previously testified he could not determine where it was.
An examination of the record discloses that the Sheriff
was not asked for his opinion as to point of impact nor
was he volunteering an opinion as to point of impact, but
that it was his opinion from the marks that there had been
a sideward skid of the (Roberts) automobile.
Q. (Mr. Beesley) All right. Now, I believe
you indicated that there were marks on the highway running from the Roberts vehicle.

A.

That's right.

Q. And all of these marks were on the east
side of the highway?

A. That's right. This vehicle-from the marks
I would be of the opinion that the vehicle-MR. NEBEKER: I object, Your Honor, to any
opinion given by the officer.

2'1

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. NEBEKER: I think he ought to confine
himself to what he saw.
THE COURT: Just tell what you saw.
MR. BEESLEY: Certainly.
A. I saw the marks leading directly from the
Roberts car back along the highway to the south
for quite some distance, and they were quite wide
apart, wider than would be made by the normal,
oh, skidding of a car going down the highway
straight, and then they ceased. All these marks were
on the east side of the highway.
Q. And were these four tire marks, or were
they just two?

A. Well, I think they were just two, say skidding and sluffing,affair. (R 155, 156)
On recross examination Jackson was asked if it did appear from the tire marks that there had been a sideward
skid of the automobile (Roberts truck).
Q. (Mr. Nebeker) Sheriff Jackson, did it appear from these tire marks that there had been a
sideward skid of this automobile?

A.

It was definitely sideward.

And you have indicated on the board that
those skid marks angle obliquely across the east
half of the highway. Is that correct?
Q.

A.

That's correct. (R 156)

28
It is obvious that Sheriff Jackson was going to volun.
teer his opinion that the Robert's truck skidded sidewards
down the highway after the impact with the defendant's
vehicle. Plaintiff's attempt to infer that the Sheriff was
prevented from giving his "opinion" as to the point of im.
pact is completely unfounded.
This court has previously recognized the importance of
safeguarding the right of trial by jury. This court has stated
that in order to give substance to that right, once the trial
has been had and a verdict rendered, it should not be regarded lightly, nor overturned because of errors or irregularities unless they are of sufficient consequence to have
affected the result. See Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411,
360 P. 2d 822 (1961); Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co., _
Utah 2d _, 397 P. 2d 990 (Utah 1964).
In weighing the testimony of patrolman Sherwood in
the overall picture of this trial it is important to recognize
that there was a conflict in the testimony as to the point
of impact. Several witnesses testified to what they had
observed at the scene of the accident. The jury had all
this evidence before it.
In Zelayeta v. Pacific Greyhound Lines Supra, under
very similar facts, the Court stated:

"Apppellants argue the question of the admissibility of Edward's (police officer) opinion as if it
were the most vital evidence in the case. They greatly overemphasize and exaggerate its importan~e.
Edwards had testified, as did several other wit·
nesses, as to what he observed at the scene of the
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accident. On direct examination he gave the reasons
upon which his opinion was predicated. Eye witnesses testified as to the point of impact. Two other
officers, at least equally competent, gave contrary
opinions based upon the same facts. The jury had
all this evidence before it. Under these circumstances, assuming that it was error to permit Ed.
wards to give his opinion as to the point of impact,
such error could not have been prejudicial. The
transcript in this case covers some 1620 pages. A
great deal of this record is devoted to the issue of
where and how the collision occurred. The case was
hotly contested and well tried on both sides. During
such a trial it would be a rare occurrence indeed if
some error in the admission or exclusion of evidence
did not occur. * * * After reading this record we
are convinced that Edwards' testimony, whether
rightfully or wrongfully admitted, played a very
minor part in the ultimate determination of the
case. (Italics ours)
This court in Hales v. Peterson Supra recognized the
necessity of viewing the overall picture of the trial to see
if the parties have been afforded an opportunity to fully
and fairly present their evidence and argument upon the
issues. If the jury has made its determination the objective of the proceeding has been accomplished. The court
said:
"Anyone acquainted with the practical operation of a trial by jury and the human factors that
must play a part therein is aware that it would be
almost impossible to complete a trial of any length
without some things occurring with which counsel,
after the case is lost, can find fault and, in zeal for
his cause, all quite in good faith, magnify into error
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which to him and the losing parties seems blameable
for their failure to.prevail. However, from the stand.
point of administering evenhanded justice the court
must dispassionately survey such claims against the
overall picture of the trial, and if the parties have
been afforded an opportunity to fully and fairly
present their evidence and arguments upon the
issues, and the jury has made its determination
thereon, the objective of the proceeding has been
accomplished. And the judgment should not be disturbed unless it is shown that there is error which
is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that it
appears that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the result would have been different in the absence
of such error, which we have concluded does not
exist here."
The court in its instruction No. 6 (R 48) advised the
Jury:

"* * * The testimony of each witness should be
considered fairly and impartially and be given such
weight and effect as you think it is entitled to,
measured by reason and common sense and the
standards given you in these instructions for determining the weight and credibility of witnesses
generally."
In instruction No. 7 (R 49) the court gave the
standard instruction relating to the weight and credibility
of a witness.
"In judging the weight and credibility of an_Y
witness, you should keep in mind the bias, if ~ny is
shown, of such witness; his interest, if any, m the
result of the trial; and any probable motive or lac~
thereof to testify as he does. You may consider bis
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appearance on the witness stand, the reasonableness
or lack thereof of his statements, his apparent
frankness and candor or the want of it, his opportunity to know, his ability to understand, his capacity to remember, together with all of the facts and
circumstances which have a bearing on the accuracy
of his statements. You should also consider any contradictory evidence and whether or not he contradicted himself, and from all the facts and circumstances given in evidence determine what weight
and credibility you should give to the testimony of
any witness."
These instructions properly advised the jury of their duty
to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. It must be presumed that the jury followed the instructions and gave
what weight they thought appropriate to the testimony of
each witness.
Patrolman Sherwood's opinion was proper and did not
constitute prejudicial error when viewed in the overall
picture of this trial.
CONCLUSION
The admission or exclusion of evidence must of necessity be left to the sound discretion of the trial court. On
cross examination the trial court permitted the patrolman
to express his opinion as to the point of impact after the
subject had been opened on direct. There was no abuse
of discretion in admitting such testimony.
The plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to fully
and fairly present her evidence and argument upon the
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issues involved in this .case. The jury, after extensive
deliberation made its determination. Based on the jury's
answers to the special verdict, the trial court entered
judgment of no cause of action.
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER
Attorneys for defendant and
respondent

